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ABSTRACT 
In most countries of the world, a sustainable agriculture is both an important and difficult issue. The agri-
cultural sector in Central and Eastern European is confronted by two large problems at the same time: 
transition processes and sustainability. The purpose of this paper is, in the first place, to make clear that 
the institutional setting is very important. Second, it gives an overview of the literature on sustainability, 
institutions and institutional innovation. The phenomenon sustainability encompassing three dimensions: 
economic, social and environmental. Institutions are not always exogenous and right so that economic 
agents will behave in the ‘correct’ (that is efficient) manner. The non-marketable attributes of agricultural 
land use such as wildlife and landscape and the quality of soil, water and air create market failure. How-
ever, they are important for sustainability. With a lack of markets to realise sustainability, there is a strong 
incentive to develop institutions capable of changing the farmer’s behaviour in ways that will achieve the 
unachievable via market signals alone.  
 
Direct government production is likely to be superior, if the government may not know what it wants and 
if the contract party has a strong tendency to reduce costs, but this is accompanied by a reduction in (non-
contractable) quality. However, in general, both situations do not apply to sustainable agriculture. Type of 
government intervention has consequence for property rights. Under influence of changes in the institu-
tional environment, the opinion about the protection of the property rights is shifting. The economic 
valuation of changes in the quality of soil, water, wildlife and landscape depends on if the change taking 
place either below or above the reference level. From the actual behaviour of the government, it can be 
concluded that the reference level is being used more and more as a watershed to the question of the allo-
cation of property rights and the use of charges or compensation. 
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SUMMARY 
The phenomenon sustainability encompassing three dimensions: economic, social and 
environmental. On the one hand these three dimensions of sustainable agriculture are 
complementary and to some extent overlapping. On the other hand, there are also trade-
offs.  Price of input and output do not include the cost of the environment, and farmers 
do not have any harmful environmental externalities that their activities cause taken into 
account. Farmers can have insufficient knowledge about the effects of their activities on 
the environment and the use of natural resources. 
  
The institutions are often considered as exogenous and the problem become one of get-
ting the prices right so that economic agents will behave in the ‘correct’ (that is effi-
cient) manner. However, institutions are not always exogenous and right. There is a 
distinction between the institutional environment and institutional arrangements. The 
institutional environment consists of informal and formal rules in the society; they are 
the rules of the game within which human actions take place. Institutional arrange-
ments, which are also called governance structures, are mechanisms for co-ordinating 
economic transactions. The three main governance structures are markets, hybrids and 
organizations. Hybrid forms concern third way solutions, like environmental co-
operatives.  
 
In a modern constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy in which the monopoly 
of violence of the government is limited by laws and rules, the government protects and 
enforces  property rights. The position and status of property rights in an economy in-
fluence the allocation and utilisation of resources and goods. Lack of property rights 
hampers the allocation and an efficient use of resources and goods.  Non-marketable 
goods of land use like the quality of soil, water and air, and wildlife and landscape have 
the properties of non-rivalry and (to some extent) non-excludability. Wildlife and land-
scape are non-rival (or indivisible) and (partially) non-excludable goods. Non-rivalry in 
consumption and in production characterizes the benefits derived from wildlife and 
landscape. Non-rivalry in consumption means indivisibility of the benefits. Non-
excludability is a characteristic which arises from a lack of property rights. From the 
institutional point of view, it is clear that in order to set a price for a commodity, it must 
be possible to exclude those who do not pay a price. For some goods, like many envi-
ronmental goods, exclusion is possible but very costly. 
 
In a modern constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy in which the monopoly 
of violence of the government is limited by laws and rules, the government protects and 
enforces the property rights, takes care of the institutional environment (rules of the 
game) and stimulates the development of efficient governance structures (markets, or-
ganization and third way solutions). The non-marketable attributes of agricultural land 
use, such as wildlife and landscape, and the quality of soil, water and air, have the prop-
erties of non-rivalry and (to some extent )non-excludability. These properties create 
market failure. With missing markets to realize sustainability, there is a strong incentive 
to develop institutional adjustments capable of changing a farmer’s behaviour so as to 
achieve the unachievable via market signals alone. It involves institutional innovation in 
the form of instruments that constrain the damage to wildlife and landscape, and the 
quality of soil, water and air.  
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Government intervention does not necessarily mean that the government will deal with 
all the aspects that can be distinguished in the production of goods and services. For 
purely public goods it is reasonable to expect that ownership, management, financing 
and production are in the hands of government. In cases of quasi-public goods, the ac-
tual method of provision should depend on efficiency and income redistribution mo-
tives. A sustainable agriculture produces not only private goods, but also (impure) pub-
lic goods. Analysing government intervention involves: (1) the formulation of opera-
tional or testable objectives for the measures to realize a sustainable agriculture; (2) the 
testing of the instruments employed; and (3) the institutional effects. The instruments 
can consist of knowledge-enhancing and communicative instruments, financial instru-
ments, physical regulations and public or government provision. The type of interven-
tion has consequence for property rights. 
 
There are two situations in which direct government production is likely to be superior. 
In the first situation, the government may not know what it wants. In that case a contract 
will be very incomplete and the costs associated with renegotiations are considerable, so 
that contracting is very expensive. The second situation arises if the contract party has a 
strong tendency to reduce costs, but this is accompanied by a reduction in (non-
contractable) quality. However, in general, both situations do not apply to sustainable 
agriculture. 
 
Strong direct regulation to realize environmental friendly farming practices is a form of 
(regulatory) takings, This which means a loss of a part of the property rights and the 
regulation causes a fall in the value of the asset. Compensated and uncompensated tak-
ings have different incentive effects. If the government need not to compensate for titu-
lar takings and regulatory takings, then it will impose too many of them. If there are too 
many restrictions, resources will be incompletely utilized. In practice, governments 
regularly change their policies on sustainability and land use. Uncertainty about these 
changes will be internalized in the investment level. Full compensation means that the 
risks are low or zero. Then, the investment level will be the highest. It is even possible 
that full compensation provide incentives for strong private efforts or investments. 
However, non-compensation of restrictions/takings gives government officials an incen-
tive to overregulate, whereas the compensation of takings makes government officials 
internalize the full cost of expropriating private property rights. 
 
Under influence of changes in the institutional environment, the opinion about the pro-
tection of the property rights is shifting. Farmers say that it is their land, and therefore 
they have the property rights. However, civilians say it is their environment. Because of 
the environment or environmental goods, public goods are taking an increasingly larger 
part of the agricultural land (including the amenities) and are becoming part of the pub-
lic domain. This has consequences for specification and protection of the property rights 
and, by that the right, for  compensation of farmers. It should be stressed that for com-
mon goods there are no individual rights, but common rights. 
 
As well as reason of equity considerations, there are also reasons of efficiency why a 
government should be careful with taking or reducing of property rights without com-
pensation. First, the lack of property rights or the threat to affect them exerts a negative 
incentive on productive activities or investment behaviour of people. Second, if a gov-
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ernment does not have to compensate, it will tend to make frequent use of the instru-
ment of takings. 
 
The economic valuation of changes in the quality of soil, water, wildlife and landscape 
depends on the change taking place either below or above the reference level. This is 
(besides the argument that in the case of negative external effects subsidies are neither 
effective nor efficient) an extra argument for applying the PPP or regulation for nega-
tive external effects of environmental goods, which are below the reference level. To 
stimulate providing positive external effects above this level, compensation based on 
the opportunity principle is an appropriate incentive both from efficiency an equity con-
siderations. Finally, from the actual behaviour of the government, it can be concluded 
that the reference level is being used more and more as a watershed to the question of 
the allocation of property rights and the use of charges or compensation. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In most countries of the world, a sustainable agriculture is both an important and diffi-
cult issue. The agricultural sector in Central and Eastern European is confronted by two 
large problems at the same time: transition processes and sustainability. This paper can 
be considered as the first step toward elaborating the relationship between sustainability 
and the institutions. Dealing with the concept of sustainability is difficult because of its 
variety of meanings and very different interpretations given to it by economists and 
ecologists. The term' institutions' is also a source of confusion. It is useful to use it in 
the same way, with the same understanding and interpretation. The purpose of this pa-
per is, in the first place, to make clear that the institutional setting is very important. 
Second, it gives an overview of the literature on sustainability, institutions and institu-
tional innovation, and third, it outlines a plan of approach to the project. 
 
Section 2 gives an overview of the three dimensions of sustainable agriculture. Until 
now, the economic and the environmental dimensions got most attention. Less or no 
attention was given to the role of the institutions. I try to show that institutions are very 
important to the triptych: economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable 
agriculture. Section 3 deals with the difference between institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements. Institutional environment consists of the rules of the game in 
a society, and institutional arrangements or governance structures are the supporting 
structures that facilitate transaction or activities. In Section 4 I investigate the relation-
ship between property rights and the characteristics of goods: rivalry and excludability. 
 
The non-marketable attributes of agricultural land use such as wildlife and landscape, 
and the quality of soil, water and air have the properties of non-rivalry and, to some 
extent, non-excludability. These properties create market failure. Because the services 
of the amenities are partly or completely non-marketable, economists say that they cre-
ate market failure. However, they are important for sustainability. With a lack of mar-
kets to realise sustainability, there is a strong incentive to develop institutions capable of 
changing the farmer’s behaviour in ways that will achieve the unachievable via market 
signals alone. In Eastern Europe farm types vary from very large farms to very small 
part-time ones, which makes the changing of farmer’s behaviour complex.  Section 5 
deals with the question of government intervention in realising sustainability. Even if 
government intervention is justified, it does not necessarily mean that governments need 
to deal with all aspects of the provision of goods and services. 
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Important to government intervention are the objectives, which should operate the tar-
gets of sustainability, and the instruments to realise them. These instruments, which 
belong to institutional innovation, can take different shapes. Section 6 describes the 
situation in which public provision or direct government provision is likely to be supe-
rior. In general, this is not true for the provision of agricultural products, even for sus-
tainable production.  
 
Section 7 deal with the types of takings or taking off of property rights and the question 
of whether the owner should be compensated or not. Strong direct regulation to realise 
environmentally friendly farming practices is a form of takings which means a loss of a 
part of the property rights. In section 8 I discuss the question of when (financial) in-
struments are used to improve the quality of water, soil and air, wildlife and landscape, 
on what principle should the use of the instruments be used. The question seems simple. 
In case of negative externalities the polluter pays principle can be used and in the case 
of positive externalities, a sort of symmetrically opposite principle such as the PPP. 
However, the economic valuation of changes in the quality of soil, water, wildlife and 
landscape depends on either the change taking place below or above the reference level. 
In section 9 I give a summary and some conclusions. 
 
2 DIMENSIONS OF SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 
In terms of usage, the concept of sustainability does not posses any single meaning or 
definition. The concept of sustainability carries a variety of meanings, exemplified by 
the very different interpretations given to it by economists and ecologists. To structure 
the discussion on sustainability, it is useful to provide a simple classification of the con-
cept. I use the term sustainable and sustainable development as synonyms. 
 
Perman et al. (1995: 51–67) give an overview of the different concept of sustainability. 
Based on the definitions of sustainability in table 3.1 in Perman et al. (1995: 57), I can 
conclude that it encompasses three dimensions: economic, social and environmental. 
The economic process is carried out by combining and substituting available resources. 
Farmers are the actors and the co-ordination is carried out by governance structures 
markets or organizations (see also section 3).  From an economic perspective, which 
addresses the question of maximizing human welfare, the issue of sustainability is not 
whether a particular natural resource will be available indefinitely, but whether human 
ingenuity can continue to find ways of using natural resources to increase welfare. This 
is often referred as weak sustainability. But from an environmental perspective, which 
addresses the question of maximizing environmental performance, the issue of sustain-
ability is whether human ingenuity can find ways to prevent the consumption of natural 
resources more rapidly than they can be replaced, and to conserve those resources that 
are considered to be irreplaceable. Thus, conserving irreplaceable natural resources is 
often referred to as strong sustainability (Legg, 1997:3). 
 
Sustainable agriculture can be considered as a process in which demand for its output - 
food, raw materials, ornamental plants and rural amenities - are met from farming prac-
tices that are economically efficient, environmentally friendly and socially acceptable. 
On the one hand, the economic dimension is concerned with the ability to maintain suf-
ficient potential production capacity to meet current and future demands for food, raw 
materials en ornamental plants through using resources efficiently (producing the 
maximum output from a given set of inputs). It means that the agricultural sector is able 
to respond to changing consumer demand and the challenges of the technological devel-
10 Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper 
opments. On the other hand, farmers have to react to the need of the people for wildlife, 
the landscape and other rural amenities. 
 
The environmental dimension is concerned with the ability to maintain sufficient natural 
resources (especially land and water), while reducing the harmful environmental effects 
of agricultural activities and enhancing the beneficial ones. On the one hand agriculture 
can cause soil, water and air pollution, soil erosion, acidification, eutrophication and 
drying up. It contributes to greenhouse gases, and lead to the loss of natural habitat, 
biodiversity and landscape features. On the other hand, agriculture can contribute to 
land conservation and flood control, provide carbon uptake, and maintain the natural 
habitat, biodiversity (wildlife) and landscape.  Many of these effects are asset specific. 
For my purpose the following are relevant. 
 
Site specific, which refers to an asset that, because of its location, becomes committed 
to a particular use. The land used for preserving wildlife and landscape is asset specific, 
because of its ‘use’ but also because of its ‘site’. Valuable areas for wildlife and land-
scape are immobile and local (i.e. tied to a particular area).  Physical asset specific, such 
as an investment in machinery, equipment or land, and has a narrowly defined purpose. 
Investments in land or in machines used for wildlife and landscape preservation have a 
narrowly defined purpose, and are sunken investments. Human asset specific, that arises 
through learning-by-doing. Preserving wildlife and landscape is a process of learning-
by-doing; it requires an investment in human capital and time. 
 
The social dimension encloses different elements. First, it concerns the institutional en-
vironment, which describes the rules of the game in a society (see section 3). It includes 
formal and informal rules or elements such as motivation, trust, commitment, values 
and norms or shared codes of conduct in the society, varying in the preferences of the 
consumers and the shift in property right relations as result of these changes. These 
elements influence the stability of the social and cultural system, the need for wide par-
ticipation in making decisions about ethical aspects of food production, such as animal 
welfare, and the confidence that the general public have in the authorities charged with 
ensuring food safety and environmental protection.  
 
Second, it concerns elements such as justice and equity in income distribution (within 
the agricultural sector and between the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy), 
fair prices of food, raw materials, ornamental plants paid to producers by consumers, 
and a balance in opportunities between rural and urban areas. The social dimension is 
not easy to quantify, and there is a strong element of subjectivity in issues of fairness, 
equity, trust and commitment (cf. Legg, 1999: 3-4).  
 
On the one hand the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable ag-
riculture are complementary and to some extent overlap. A prosperous and economi-
cally efficient agriculture sector is able to undertake and invest in environmental 
friendly practice. It is likely to have the knowledge and incentive (by having the full 
private property rights) to maintain its resource base, so ensuring that it remains pros-
perous. An economically efficient sector will be getting the most from the available 
resources, with prices of agricultural production reflecting their costs of production, 
which contributes to keeping food prices low. Environmentally friendly production and 
low prices for agricultural products are positive for the social dimension. Ensuring a 
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clean environment and a varied wildlife, a beautiful and valuable landscape and other 
rural amenities also enhances social welfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, there are also trade-offs among the three dimensions of sustainable 
agriculture. Producing more food can be at the cost of environmental degradation. This 
can be the case when input and output prices do not include the costs of environmental, 
and farmers do not have to take into account any harmful environmental externalities 
that their activities cause. This can also occur when farmers do not have sufficient 
knowledge about the effects of their activities on the environment and the use of natural 
resources, or sufficient financial resources to address such effects, or are not remuner-
ated for any environmental benefits they generate over and above what is expected of 
them. Moreover, farms in the farming sector, like other businesses in the economy, of-
ten have incentives to enlarge their enterprises in order to reap economies of scale. This 
can be at the expense of wildlife and landscape features (such as stone walls, hedges and 
SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC
1
2 3
4
5
6
Figure 1. Linkages between the economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of sustainable agriculture 
KEY 
 
1. Environmental impacts from agriculture on living, working, wildlife and landscape condi-
tions and  recreational opportunities 
2. Pressure on environmental resources in agriculture, demands of environmental public goods 
3. Effect of the institutional environment on the agricultural production process, food con-
sumption patterns, changing preferences for environmental friendly goods, and wildlife and 
landscape, shifting property rights relations 
4. Income distribution, rural employment opportunities, food prices 
5. Productive use of natural resources used in agriculture (wildlife, landscape, environmental 
quality, carbon sinks) 
6. Pressure/enhancement of environmental resources, investment in environmental protection, 
wildlife and landscape preservation 
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coppices), the adoption of monocultures rather than crop rotations, using less labour, 
more chemicals, and with less dependence on local rural communities (Legg, 1999: 4). 
 
The various linkages between the key dimensions of sustainability agriculture are 
shown in simplified representation in figure 1 which is partly based on Legg (1999: 5-
6). 
 
3 SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONS 
In many studies about sustainability or sustainable development (which I treat as syno-
nyms) the institutional structure is considered as exogenous and the problem becomes 
one of ‘getting the prices right’ so that atomistic agents will behave in a ‘correct’ (that 
is, efficient) manner. From this presumption of right economic behaviour human action 
will help to bring about to bounteous agricultural production, the generation of an eco-
nomic surplus in rural areas, the creation of new jobs in urban manufacturing, the proper 
use of natural environment, and the realization of a modern economy in which agricul-
tural is but a minor part of the total economic activities and the national economy. Get-
ting the prices right follows logically from the prior problem of getting the institutions 
right. However, institutions are not always right (Bromley, 1999: 3). 
 
It is important to distinguish between institutional environment and institutional ar-
rangements. Institutional environment is the man-made constraints that structure politi-
cal, economic, and social interactions. These consist of both informal constraints (sanc-
tions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights). This definition orginates from North (1991: 7), although instead 
of institutional environment he uses the term institutions. The institutional environment 
delineates the rules of the game within which the institutional arrangements actually 
operate. It prescibes/determines the rule of conduct within which human actions take 
place. For example, what most economists would agree to call an institution, is a 
framework that defines the ways in which property rights can be implemented and en-
forced (Ménard, 1995: 164). 
 
Institutional arrangements, which are also called governance structures, are mechanisms 
to co-ordinate economic transactions. Important contributions in the recent literature on 
questions about institutional arrangements focus on the polar cases and the ‘hybrid 
forms’. According to Williamson (1987: 16), the polar cases are markets and hierar-
chies. In markets, co-ordination is based on prices, while in hierarchies, it is based on 
authority. Hierarchy involves the capacity to supervise and control, including the right 
to make decisions (cf. Ménard, 1994: 237). Many economists subscribe to Williamson’s 
bipolar distinction between market and ‘something else’, but for ‘something else’ they 
prefer the term organizations instead of hierarchies. They argue that Williamson has 
taken an extremely narrow view of non-market co-ordination. Organizations cannot 
operate exclusively through command: they also require co-operation by their members. 
Such co-operation involves their commitment to specific goals, their willingness to en-
dorse or transform existing routines, and their responsiveness to incentives deliberately 
designed to maintain or improve their participation (cf. Ménard, 1995: 174; Douma and 
Schreuders, 1998: 140). 
 
The two governance structures ‘markets’ and ‘organizations’ are both embedded in an 
‘institutional environment’. However, there are areas of overlap, which give rise to hy-
brid forms (Ménard, 1995: 163, 173). A major contribution of the recent literature on 
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transactions is the demonstration of the fundamental importance to “hybrid forms’ be-
tween the two polar cases of markets and organizations. Hybrid forms are characterized 
by specific combinations of market incentives and modalities of co-ordination involving 
some forms of hierarchical relationship (Ménard, 1995: 175). The three main govern-
ance structures, markets, hybrids, and organizations (sometimes referred as hierarchies) 
are called institutional arrangements. 
 
Williamson (1987; 1996; 1998) is a direct descendant of Coase (1937; cf. Putterman 
and Kosner (eds), 1996: 89-104). In the standard approach on Coase and Williamson, 
organizations are primarily characterised by authority or ‘fiat’, the capacity of some 
agents to give orders. Williamson’s original formulation of the markets and hierarchies 
paradigm has been criticized as a too narrow approach to modern organizations (cf. 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 291; Hart, 1995: 29-30; Douma and Schreuder, 1998: 140). 
The criticism pertains to two related points: 
- it is too simple to view markets and hierarchies as the only two governance 
structures for transactions as there is a third way of transacting 
- markets and hierarchies should not be viewed as two mutually exclusive govern-
ance structures as hybrid forms exist as well. 
 
In contrast to hierarchical co-ordination - that is mostly vertical - the third way of co-
ordination consists of forms of horizontal non-market co-ordination, in which more or 
less equal members have informal communication with each other. Important basic 
elements of these relationships are motivation, trust and commitment. The co-ordination 
mechanisms that are used within such an organization are mutual adjustments and the 
standardization of values and norms. Mutual adjustment refers to the co-ordination 
achieved by informal horizontal communication. Standardization of norms and values 
means shared codes of conduct usually for the entire organization, so that everyone 
functions according to the same norms of behaviour. The motivation, trust and com-
mitment underlying the operation of this organization can be understood as evolving 
from the standardization of values and norms or shared codes of conduct through selec-
tion (cf. Douma and Schreuder, 1998: 140 –143). To work effectively, such a horizontal 
organization could be partly based on formal rules, but these must be complemented by 
informal rules (sanctions, conventions, norms or codes of behaviour) that supplement 
them and reduce enforcing costs (cf. North, 1993: 20). 
  
Standardization of values and norms leads to common values and norms. Common val-
ues and norms pertain to a congruent set of preferences within a group of people, guid-
ing co-ordination principles among them. Groups range from a family to a club, from a 
church to a volunteer group or a team of people working towards a common goal. Re-
peated interaction promotes solidarity, consensus, trust, and common values and norms 
in a group. Dasgupta (1991: 75, 79) interprets social norms as implicit social contracts 
to cooperate, embedded in customs and rituals, and resulting from repeated interactions. 
If people are not extremely myopic, it is the self-interest of each member of the group to 
keep the norms; in other words, the norms are self-enforcing. Common values and 
norms diminish the incidence of opportunistic behaviour between the members of the 
group. Effective co-ordination based on common values and norms coincides with a 
strong motivation and high commitment of individual members of a group to achieve 
their common goal (CPB, 1997:  55).  
 
Nooteboom (1999: 24- 25) emphasizes the role and meaning of trust. Because trusting 
people are less secretive and more readily supply information, this role has the effect of 
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lowering the cost of search and monitoring. Trust reduces the costs of contracting and 
control because it decreases fear of opportunism and leads to the acceptance of more 
influence from the partner. People who trust each other will deliberate and renegotiate 
on the basis of give and take (‘voice’) rather than walk out (‘exit’) when conflicts arise.  
 
Common values and norms, and trust are very important not only as a third way of co-
ordination, but also in helping the market mechanism function well. If people do not 
trust each other or if cheating each other is normal, then the market mechanism can not 
work. A present example is Russia where the market as a co-ordination mechanism has 
not managed to get off the ground properly. If people do not keep values and norms, the 
economy undermine its own basis.   
 
Most people work in an organization of some kind. Almost everyone grows up in an 
organization called the family. There is a variety of groupings in which people interact 
for various reasons. The most important characteristic of such an organization is that the 
members cooperate under some forms of agreements. This agreement may be based on 
a formal contract, on quite informal contract, mutual expectation, or just on bonds of 
kinship. Co-operation or interaction inside an organization is often more important than 
a market exchange, though an organization (like a firm) also has to interact with mar-
kets, as when inputs are purchased and outputs are sold (FitzRoy et al., 1997: 1).    
 
An example of the third way of co-ordination is environmental co-operatives for farm-
ers. The question is how to typify the institutional arrangement/governance structure 
environmental cooperative for farmers. On the one hand, environmental co-operative is 
an organization. On the other,  it has a relationship with its members who maintain their 
private property rights and who remain mainly as independent farmers. A number of 
questions arise regarding these contractual relationships. What are the characteristics of 
the contracts between members and the organization? How are the property rights of the 
‘organization’ and the ‘members’ specified? What is the co-ordination mechanism? 
Who has the power of control or the right over the residual income? 
 
Transactions are co-ordinated by governance structures; such as markets, (hierarchical) 
organisations and other institutional arrangements.  The results of these transactions are 
strongly influenced by the institutional environment. In the western world this environ-
ment has developed from a situation in which monarchs had the monopoly of violence 
to one with a constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy. In the past the mon-
archs used their monopoly of power to rob the people, slavery, serfdom and toll collec-
tion were the order of the day. People were hesitant to carry out productive activities, as 
they were afraid that the monarch would seize any returns. Society has a kind of hold-up 
problem. In other words,  lack of property rights or the erosion of these rights create a 
negative incentive for people to undertake productive activities or investments (cf. Bov-
enberg and Teulings, 1999: 364 - 367). 
  
In a modern constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy, the monarch has been 
replaced by the politician, and the count by a civil servant. Robbery, slavery, serfdom 
and toll collection have been replaced by taxes. In a modern constitutional state and a 
parliamentary democracy the governmental monopoly of violence is restricted by laws 
and rules. These form a part of the formal rules of the game of the institutional envi-
ronment. Together with the informal rules, they form the rules of conduct for the gov-
ernment, firms, households, groups, and individuals. 
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Getting the institutions right not only means getting the institutional environment right, 
but also getting the institutional arrangements right. Both are important. One of the sali-
ent differences between the institutional environment and the institutions of governance 
are that the former mainly defines (or acts as a constraint on) the environment of the 
latter (Williamson, 1996: 5). A governance structure is a way to implement the ‘rules of 
the game’ as they are defined by the institutional environment and make them opera-
tional. Governance structures or institutional arrangements are supporting structures for 
transactions.   
 
A second difference is that the institutional environment operates at a higher level of 
generalization than do markets and organization. It delineates the rules of the game 
within which such ‘governance structures’ actually operate. For example, the legal sys-
tem, which most economists would agree on calling an institution, is a framework 
which defines the ways in which property rights can be implemented and enforced (Mé-
nard, 1995: 164). Thus the level of analysis is different. The institutions of governance 
operate at the level of individual transactions, whereas the institutional environment is 
more concerned with the composed levels of activity.   
 
4 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOODS 
In a modern constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy in which the govern-
ment’s monopoly of power is limited by laws and rules, the government protects and 
enforces property rights. The property rights are an important part of the work of the 
New Institutional Economy (NIE). The origin of the work goes back to Coase (1960), 
Alchian (1965), Alchian (1967), Demsetz (1967), and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The 
central thesis of the property rights view is that the particular structure of the property 
rights in an economy influences the allocation and utilization of economic goods (re-
sources) in specific and predictable ways (Furuboth and Pejovich, 1972: 1139). As a 
result, ceteris paribus, the value of traded goods depends on how the property rights 
over these goods are defined. Since individuals try to maximize utility not only as con-
sumers but also as members of organizations (e.g. private firms, government bureau, 
university), any change in the system of property rights will have a specific and predict-
able influence on the allocation of resources, the composition of the goods produced 
and the distribution of income. Therefore, lack of property rights or the taking of them 
by the government without any compensation influence efficiency and equity.  
 
In addition to marketable products like food, raw materials and ornamental plants the 
agricultural sector also produces non-marketable goods like the quality of soil, water, 
air, and wildlife and landscape. These non-marketable goods can be seen as a ‘by-
product’ of land use by farmers or as a result of joint production of agricultural land use. 
The character of these goods means that they are mostly non-marketable goods. The 
market fails as co-ordination and price-setting mechanism. There are two important cri-
teria to characterize goods and to investigate the reason for market failure: excludability 
and rivalry. 
 
These non-marketable goods of land use (like the quality of soil, water and air, and 
wildlife and landscape) have the properties of non-rivalry and (to some extent) non-
excludability. In the case of wildlife and landscape, we have to deal with are non-rival 
(or indivisible) and (partially) non-excludable goods. Non-rivalry in consumption and in 
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production characterizes the benefits derived from wildlife and landscape. Non-rivalry 
in consumption means indivisibility of benefits. A good is non-rival or indivisible when 
a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the slight-
est, from the consumption opportunities still available to others from the same unit 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 8). Non-rivalry in production is often a result of joint pro-
duction  (Boadway and Bruce, 1989: 112-113).  
Non-excludability is the property of a good in which the benefits of that good not only 
can be, but in fact are, made available to all. Non-excludability, because it refers to a 
lack of property rights, is the crucial factor in determining which goods must be pub-
licly provided. Exclusion may not be feasible for technological reasons, as is the case 
for national defence, or for an institutional reason, as is the case when property rights 
cannot be assigned. When exclusion is impossible, the free rider problem and the asso-
ciated prisoner’s dilemma arise (Boadway and Bruce, 1989: 129 - 130). 
 
Once the characteristics rivalry and excludability of goods are defined, the so-called 
spectrum of goods can be distinguished. Pure public goods have the properties of non-
rivalry and non-excludability. Pure private goods are fully rival and excludable. The in-
between points along this spectrum are occupied by different types of goods (or bads). 
Goods whose benefits are non- rival and (partially) excludable are called impure public 
goods. There are also goods whose benefits are (partially) rival and non-excludable. 
These are called common goods. Table 1 gives an overview of the different types of 
goods. 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of goods based on rivalry and excludability 
 
Rivalry 
Excludability 
Non rivalry 
(indivisible goods) 
Rivalry (divisible 
goods) 
 0% 100% 
Impossibility of:   
- exclusion 
- rejection 
 
0% 
 
 
 
100% 
(1) 
Pure public good 
2) 
Common goods, com-
mon resource, and open 
access resources 
Possibility of:     
- exclusion 
- rejection 
 
(3) 
Impure public goods 
(4) 
Pure private goods 
 
 
An important subclass of goods whose benefits are excludable but partially non-rival 
are the club goods (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 9). The essential difference between club 
goods and pure public goods depends on the existence of an exclusion mechanism. A 
club is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the fol-
lowing: production costs, the members’ characteristics (e.g., members have land, are 
farmers) or a good characterized by excludable benefits (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 33 -
34). 
 
Non-excludability is a characteristic that arises from a lack of property rights (Boadway 
and Bruce, 1989: 110). From the institutional point of view, it is interesting to look at 
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circumstances that may constitute obstacles to the establishment of private property 
rights. It is clear that in order to set a price for a commodity, it must be possible to ex-
clude those who do not pay a price. For some goods, exclusion is possible but costly. 
The metering of water supplies, and the scrambling of radio and television broadcast are 
examples of costly, and not universally adopted, exclusion devices. Exclusion might be 
possible at a cost in a situation involving environmental pollution or congestion. There 
are, however, other goods for which exclusion is intrinsically impossible. If citizens are 
excluded from a public park, then it is, by definition, no longer a public park. National 
defence is another commonly quoted example of a good from which exclusion is not 
possible. In any event, if exclusion is impossible or too costly to be privately profitable, 
an essential precondition for the establishment of effective property rights is lacking 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 43). 
 
The failure of property rights to be well defined is, then, an important ingredient of 
many externality situations. However, such a failure is not reason enough by itself to 
conclude that there is an inefficiency and hence a scope for government intervention. 
The government can also fail and this might be even worse than market failure.   
 
The non-marketable attributes of agricultural land use such as wildlife and landscape, 
and the quality of soil, water and air have the properties of non-rivalry and (to some 
extent) non-excludability. These properties create market failure. With ‘missing mar-
kets’ to realise sustainability, there is an strong incentive to develop institutional ad-
justments capable of changing the farmer’s behaviour so as to the achieve unachievable 
via market signals alone. This arises because consumers’ marginal willingness to pay 
for sustainable agriculture is greater than what is reflected in the market prices. This 
disequilibrium creates incentives for institutional innovation in the form of instruments 
that constrain the damage to wildlife and landscape, and the quality of soil, water and 
air (cf. Runge, 1999: 12 –14).  
 
5 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION; AIMS AND INSTRUMENTS 
In a modern constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy in which the monopoly 
of power of the government is restricted by laws and rules, the government protects and 
enforces the property rights, takes care of the institutional environment (rules of the 
game) and stimulates the development of efficient governance structures (markets, or-
ganization and third way solutions). 
 
Even if there is a justification for government intervention, an analysis of this interfer-
ence is necessary.  It casts light on the functioning of the government itself. After all, 
governments can also fail (non-market failures). The reasons for this can be the lack of 
information, the nature of the political decision-making process, the bureaucratic way of 
production or disincentives arising from regulations, taxes, levies and subsidies (Schram 
et al, 1991: 95). Government intervention does not necessarily mean that the govern-
ment deals with all the aspects that can be distinguished in the production of goods and 
services. The most encompassing government intervention takes place when ownership, 
management, financing and production are in government hands. Ownership and man-
agement raise questions about of who the owner is and who manages (including plan-
ning). The decision to carry the costs of a facility collectively need not imply that the 
government should also take on the production. With reference to costs, the question is 
who takes care of financing, i.e. who pays. The contribution to the costs by the govern-
ment can vary from zero to hundred percent. 
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For purely public goods it is reasonable to expect that ownership, management, financ-
ing and production are in the hands of government. In the case of quasi-public goods, 
the actual method of provision should depend on efficiency and redistribution motives. 
The characteristics of excludability and rivalry are tangible criteria for economic effi-
ciency. In the end, policy considerations determine the actual supply method: govern-
ment production or private provision. A sustainable agriculture produces not only pri-
vate goods but also (impure) public goods. 
 
The most important points to consider when analysing government intervention in order 
to realize sustainable agriculture can be found in the government's objectives, its meas-
ures or instruments. The implementation of this institutional innovation should contrib-
ute to achieving an equilibrium between the willingness to pay and the (marginal value) 
of sustainable agriculture to the society as a whole (Runge, 1999: 13). For judging gov-
ernment measures the following steps can be distinguished: (1) the formulation of op-
erational or testable objectives (of sustainable agriculture) for the measures; (2) the test-
ing of the instruments employed, in terms of their: 
a. effect, i.e. the extent to which they are used (this reveals their acceptability); 
b. effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which the instrument contributes to the reali-
zation of the set goals 
c. efficiency, i.e. the ratio between costs and benefits 
d. income distribution aspects, i.e. who profits from the benefits and which 
group in  society bears the burden or costs 
e. legitimacy or (public) support for the instrument. 
 
The targets of a government policy to obtain a sustainable agricultural sector will have 
to be developed1. This means that the agricultural policy for the agricultural sector 
should include environmental objectives. Oskam et al. (1998: 41- 45) give an overview 
of a set of objects for environmental policy and the criteria for evaluating the instru-
ments useful for research project Sustainable Agriculture. 
 
According to this overview, the government has a broad range of instruments for pursu-
ing this goal. Both the targets and the instruments are part of the institutional environ-
ment. The instruments can be grouped in several ways: knowledge-enhancing and 
communicative instruments, financial instruments and physical regulations. The WRR 
(1992: 67) opts for a matrix with behaviour, transaction and persuasion on one side, and 
the role of government in public law, in private law and as a participant on the other. 
The sub-headings below contain a classification based on a combination of influence on 
behaviour and the role of government. 
 
5.1 RESEARCH, EXTENSION AND EDUCATION 
With this knowledge-enhancing and communicative instrument the government tries to 
achieve a voluntary modification of the behaviour of producers and consumers.  One of 
the key assumptions of the market of full competition is that all information is available 
to the decision-makers (Boadway and Bruce, 1989: 123). Lack of information can lead 
to producers and consumers making the wrong decisions. The government can use this 
                                                 
1 Several approaches are used to compare policy instruments against the background of objectives. Both 
methodology and the type of objectives are important. From a methodological perspective fixed and 
flexible target may be used. For an overview see Oskam  et al. (1998: 41-45).  
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instrument to try and augment and correct the functioning of the market as an informa-
tion supply mechanism. A good information supply can lead to a change in preference 
and, in that way, to a change in the behaviour of producers and consumers. Individuals 
can become more aware of their property rights in the area of wildlife and landscape 
and the quality of soil, water and air, which include sustainability. 
 
The triptych research, extension and education is largely responsible for the growth 
which the agricultural sector has experienced in Western countries. For example, in the 
Netherlands, public expenditures on these items have resulted in a rise in productivity of 
nearly 5 % per annum for the period 1947 –1987 (Van der Meer et al., 1991: 54). This 
means that this set of instruments has been effective and efficient. Application of these 
instruments to realize a sustainable agricultural sector will be efficient and effective as 
well.  
 
5.2 STATUTORY REGULATIONS OR DIRECT REGULATION 
The government prescribes that certain actions be prohibited or compulsory, or allows 
them provided that prescribed rules of behaviour are observed. Among these are the 
well-known set of interdictions, obligations and licences. These prescriptions are direct 
in character. They have a direct and compulsory influence on the behaviour of produc-
ers and consumers. A characteristic of statutory regulations is that they impose consid-
erable limitations on property rights. In the Netherlands, for example, we see their ap-
plication reflected in the instruments the government has employed for the conservation 
of the quality of soil, water and air.  Prohibitions and obligations dominate the policy 
advocated.  Licences have so far hardly been applied as instruments of environmental 
policy for agriculture and horticulture in the Netherlands. Licences can be seen as prop-
erty rights. The application of licences or permits is not meaningful in the case of any 
material or activity that can be lethal to man and environment in very small concentra-
tions. Licences or permits may come in the shape of the right to carry out certain activi-
ties like construction, cutting trees, emission rights and the (restricted) use of manure (in 
the form of restricted use of the minerals N, P and K) on land.  In principle, emission 
and pollution rights can be tradable. Pollution rights, being tradable, bring flexibility in 
the allocation of the limited quantity of emissions tolerated.  
 
Statutory measures comprise regulations amounting to physical limitations, for example 
quotas and coupons. A distinction can be made between regulations under public and 
private law. The government role in public law, combined with the behavioural mecha-
nism of 'compulsion', results in direct regulation. In private law regulations, the role of 
government is limited to legislation and the role of facilitator for a civic implementation 
process. In this approach tradable production or pollution rights are a combination of 
the public and private law role of the government. There is a limitation on total pollu-
tion, enforced by public law (the quantity of licences determined unilaterally by gov-
ernment) and private law rules for the trade in licences. As the target group is con-
fronted both with compulsion (not to exceed the volume permitted) and with the oppor-
tunity to realize transactions (trade in licences), aspects of both behavioural and transac-
tion play a role. 
 
5.3 FISCAL FACILITIES 
Where fiscal facilities are concerned the emphasis is not on the statutory but on the fi-
nancial aspect.  The tax mechanism is used as the steering mechanism through tax re-
bates or tax benefits for persons or institutions. Among the tax facilities are those given 
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to the owners of woodlands, nature/wildlife areas (for example tax exemption for for-
estry enterprises).  For certain investments aiming at environmental protection, there 
can be facilities for accelerated depreciation. Tax benefits are an attempt to exert direct 
influence on the behaviour of economic subjects. 
 
The advantage of fiscal regulations over subsidies is that they are simpler. No money 
has to be handed over. Government tax advantages have two types of costs: lost income 
and costs of implementation. Another objection against tax benefits is that they may 
give rise to transfers that may change the secondary income distribution. From a finan-
cial point of view, enterprises with a high marginal tax rate are in a better position to 
invest than enterprises with a lower tariff. 
 
5.4 SUBSIDIES/COMPENSATIONS AND CHARGES/LEVIES 
By granting subsidies and imposing charges, the government aims at having an indirect 
influence on the quantity and quality of an activity. The expenditure on subsidies or the 
income from charges is directly related to certain activities by the person being subsi-
dized or paying a charge. When subsidies are applied to activities with favourable ex-
ternal effects, they can be used as 'compensation' or 'stimulation' premiums. Compensa-
tion premiums are paid for income lost as a consequence of a government regulation. 
An example is the compensation paid to farmers following a management agreement. 
Income compensation brings the economic subjects back to their original income level. 
Stimulation premiums are less restrictive. They are not linked to any statutory arrange-
ment, public or private. The government gives financial support to encourage certain 
activities. Economic subjects are free to use this financial support and there is no com-
pulsion to carry out the activity concerned.  Applications are: subsidies for afforestation, 
maintenance of landscape elements, environmentally friendly manure storage on farms 
and environmentally friendly production techniques, etc. (Compare EU Environmental 
Directive 2078/92). 
 
In the case of activities with negative external effects, for example polluting emissions, 
the application of the subsidy instrument may be undesirable.  Baumol and Oates (1989: 
211-233) show that the subsidizing of emission reduction in a situation of full competi-
tion decreases the emission per enterprise, but increases total emission. The lower cost 
resulting from subsidies will lead to a lower market price and, in its wake, to greater 
sales and the entry of new polluting enterprises (see also WRR, 1992: 133).  In this 
situation subsidies are neither effective nor efficient. 
 
Like subsidies and tax facilities, charges belong to the systems of financial incentives. 
The influence of charges on the behaviour of economic actors is different from that of 
subsidies. Charges are taxes that raise the cost price of certain (in this case, polluting) 
activities. The imposition of a charge can be conceived of as an effort to give a price to 
negative external effects, which are thus included in the production and consumption 
decisions of economic subjects. By placing a levy on environmentally polluting activi-
ties, the government may try to influence their amount and in this way, the quality of 
soil, water and air. The legitimacy of this indirect method of managing the environment 
can be traced back to the 'polluter pays' principle. 
 
A pollution tax is supposed to charge the instigator of the negative external effect with 
the costs of the damage done. He will bring these costs into the weighing up of the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of his production and consumption. The activity that causes the 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 21 
Discussion Paper 
negative external effects will be pushed back to the point where the marginal benefits of 
the external effect for the instigator equal the marginal costs of the external effect on 
account of the damage to be compensated. 
 
Figure 1 shows the course of the marginal costs of the damage reduction curve and of 
the marginal cost curve. The horizontal axis OS gives the pollution and reasoning from 
S the damage that is being avoided.  The reduction of damage is accompanied by in-
creasing costs.  As a consequence, the marginal damage reduction curve (CD) shows a 
rising course starting from S. This curve gives the marginal costs of damage reduction.  
From origin (0) the damage rises as an activity increases. This is given by the curve AB. 
If curve AB is read from B to A, then this curve represents the marginal damage that has 
been prevented. The optimum is where marginal cost = marginal benefits.  So Q' gives 
the optimum level of pollution and Q'S the amount by which pollution must be reduced.  
Marginal damage of Q' has a corresponding price (P).  Then OP is the shadow price per 
unit of pollution or damage to the environment. 
 
The shadow price for pollution emissions must be set in such a way that the marginal 
damage prevented equals the marginal costs of abatement.  In that case OP is the opti-
mum level of the shadow price for the pollution, SQ' the amount by which it must be 
reduced and OQ' the quantity of pollution allowed. Figure 2 shows the interchange be-
tween the improvement of the environment and the costs connected to it. The shadow 
price OP forms the theoretical basis for the imposition of a levy. 
 
An argument in favour of levies is that the market is left intact as a transaction mecha-
nism.  A bureaucratic apparatus as required for public law regulations, information 
gathering, legislation, implementation and checks can be omitted.  Baumol and Oates 
(1989: 163 -165) state that the use of charges enables environmental goals to be reached 
at the lowest cost.  A condition for this lowest cost property is that firms minimize their 
costs at every output level and that the market prices of inputs reflect the 'opportunity 
costs'. 
 
However, a system of charges is not without problems. It also requires information on 
the existing volume of pollution, the different alternatives to damage limitation, pre-
vented damages and their evaluation and the spread of pollution (Siebert, 1987: 102).  
Furthermore, various activities or pollutants interact, which means that the conse-
quences of one pollutant cannot simply be added to the consequences of another activ-
ity. The problem of deficient ecological knowledge comes on top of this.  In many cases 
no direct link can be constructed/founded between emissions and concentrations of pol-
lutants in the environment. An iterative process of trial and error can be developed to 
find the suitable and correct level of the tax.  This process can be initiated by choosing 
an arbitrary level for observing the extent of reduction when that tax has been imposed. 
If the reduction realized differs from the desired level then the tax can be adjusted (Ti-
etenberg, 1992: 372-375). 
 
22 Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 GOVERNMENT FACILITIES 
Market failure and failure to reach sector or macro-economic goals can be a motive for 
the government to take property, management, financing and production of certain ser-
vices into its own hand. This is the most comprehensive form of government interven-
tion.  Decision making, financing, implementation and exploitation are in the hands of 
the government, which thereby secures scarce means with alternative uses: land, labour 
and capital, and produces goods and services with these. Services which the government 
takes over may, in practice, cover the whole spectrum from purely public goods to 
purely individual goods and services.   
 
Traditionally, the existence of market failure provides a rationale for having government 
intervention. However, market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
government intervention. Critics of government intervention use three arguments (Sti-
glitz, 1998: 5- 6): 
1) Government is unnecessary because anything the government can do, the private 
sector can do better or, in terms of Boadway and Bruce (1989: 15), the govern-
ment may not be able to do any better than the market. However, there one big 
difference: the government has power that private sector does not have. 
2) Government is ineffective because anything the government does, the private 
sector can and will undo. However, whenever government take action or has 
rules that change relative prices or redistribute income, and whenever the private 
sector has imperfect information concerning government actions, the state’s 
policies cannot be fully undone. 
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3) The incentive structures inherent in public institutions imply that government 
actions generally decrease societal welfare, or, at the very least, inhibit produc-
tive economic activities by taking resources away from the one group and giving 
them to another, often less deserving group.  
 
A possible check whether government intervention is preferable is offered by the appli-
cation of cost-benefit analysis (Laffont, 1990: 27).      
 
Government intervention does not necessarily mean that the government  has to deal 
with all the aspects that can be distinguished in the production of goods and services. 
The most encompassing government intervention takes places when ownership, plan-
ning, management, financing en production are in government hands. If intervention is 
considered necessary because of market failure, the question arises to what extent? The 
whole spectrum of possibilities ranges from the polar case ‘from ownership to produc-
tion’ (we call this public production) to the other polar case ‘only a contribution in cost 
of the provision by private production’. For purely public goods, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that ownership, planning, management, financing and production are in govern-
ment hands. In case of impure public goods the type of provision should depend on effi-
ciency and redistribution motives (cf. Rosen, 1995: 55). 
 
Stiglitz (1986: 203) distinguishes three major category type of actions: (1) public provi-
sion; (2) private provision, with taxes and subsidies aimed at encouraging those activi-
ties the government wishes to encourage and discouraging those activities it wishes to 
discourage; (3) private provision with government regulation, aimed at ensuring that 
firms act in the desired way. The consequences of any government programme are criti-
cally dependent on its nature.  If the government decides to bear responsibility for the 
whole traject of the provision, it still has to decide on how the output is to be allocated. 
It can charge for the good at market prices; it can charge for the good at something ap-
proximating the cost of production; it can charge for the good much less than the cost of 
production; it can provide the good freely. Similarly, if the good is to be privately pro-
vided, the government has to decide whether to: (a) contract directly for the production 
of the commodity and retain responsibility for distributing goods; (b) provide a subsidy 
to producers, with the hope that some of the benefits will be passed on to consumers 
through lower prices; or (c) provide a subsidy to consumers (Stiglitz, 1986: 203).    
 
These three types of actions (government interventions) have consequences for property 
rights. The foundation and functioning of government require a transfer of resources 
from private to public. Private ownership has to be transferred to public use. The gov-
ernment has the power to take and regulate use of property. This power  reduces the 
clarity and certainty of property rights. The resulting welfare losses represent the eco-
nomic cost of doing so. Against the economic costs is the benefit of providing public 
goods. 
 
6 PUBLIC PROVISION OR DIRECT GOVERNMENT PRODUCTION2  
Unified ownership or do-it-yourself (by government or nature conservation organiza-
tions) can be an alternative to private provision by contracts with farmers. The choice 
between in-house provision and contracting out has proved to be controversial. Hart et 
al. (1997: 1127- 1161) have developed a theory of government ownership and contract-
                                                 
2 Based on Polman and Slangen (1999) 
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ing that throws light on the cost and the quality of the service under alternative provi-
sion schemes. In their model, the provider of the service - whether a government em-
ployee or a private contractor - can invest his time either to improve the quality of the 
service or to reduce its cost. 
 
Both types of improvements prior to implementation require the approval of the owner 
of the asset. If the provider is a government employee, he or she needs the government’s 
approval to implement either improvement, since the government retains residual con-
trol rights over the asset. As a result, the employee receives only a fraction of the return 
of either the cost reduction or the quality improvement. By contrast, if the provider is a 
private contractor, he or she has the residual control rights over the asset, and hence 
does not need to get government approval for a cost reduction. At the same time, if a 
private contractor wants to improve quality and get a higher payment, he needs to rene-
gotiate with the government since the government is the buyer. As a consequence, the 
private contractor generally has a stronger incentive to reduce costs as well as to im-
prove quality compared to the government employee (Hart, et al., 1997: 1129). 
 
There are two situations in which direct government production is likely to be superior 
(Shleifer, 1998: 13; Van Damme, 1998: 811). In the first situation, the government may 
not know what it wants. In that case, a contract will be very incomplete and the costs 
associated with renegotiations are considerable, so that contracting become very expen-
sive. The second situation arises if the contract party has a strong tendency to reduce 
costs, but this is accompanied by a reduction in (non-contractible) quality. The adverse 
effect of cost reduction on quality is significant (see also Hart et al., 1997: 1142). In 
both situations government production is likely to be a better solution. However, in gen-
eral, both situations do not apply to sustainable agriculture. For small parts of it, direct 
government production can be an alternative. 
 
For example, if more wildlife is wanted, agricultural land could be converted into wild-
life areas. However, if the government does this, there are important financial and eco-
nomic consequences (cf. Oskam and Slangen, 1998: 129). This is a very expensive al-
ternative to contracts with farmers, and it creates the problem of government failure, 
which is the domain of the public choice theory. This theory emphasizes the self-
interest of politicians and bureaucrats as an important factor in understanding govern-
ment failure. However, a complete theory of non-market failure also requires considera-
tion of the internal organization of the government. According to Laffont and Martimort 
(1998: 674, 683), the regulatory rights and the design of communication channels be-
tween the regulatory hierarchy and the interest groups both affect the behaviour of the 
government agencies. Different institutional arrangements affect economic efficiency 
and the distribution of rent induced in the economy. [Laffont and Martimort’s term 
’regulatory rights’ has roughly the same meaning as the Hart et al.’s (1997) ‘residual 
rights of control’]. 
 
Agreements for preserving wildlife and landscape with farmers are a second-best solu-
tion (see also Slangen, 1997: 152). Incomplete contracts involve hidden information and 
hidden actions. The problem of hidden information can be reduced by ‘building-in’ self-
selection conditions into the contract. For example farmers may have to follow courses 
about wildlife management, or voluntarily become members of an environmental co-
operative with membership dues. The problem of hidden action could be resolved by 
monitoring or incentive contacts. An alternative solution is to require posting of bonds 
to guarantee performance, which can be paid back if the performance is satisfactory or 
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if  targets are reached. Using such solutions may still lead to incomplete contracts, but 
some self-enforcing elements could be incorporated.  
 
Most of the contracts for preserving wildlife and landscape are neo-classical contracts. 
Weak management agreements like the ‘less favoured areas’ agreements or simple 
maintenance agreements could have elements of, or have the character of a classical 
contract. In the case of one precisely defined task (e.g. grazing animals on land for a 
specified period), classical contracts appear appropriate. However, for packages of 
tasks, contracts should be neo-classical and the appropriate governance structure have a 
hybrid form. Of course, this is a second-best solution, but there are no better alterna-
tives.  
 
Characteristic of neo-classical contracts is the restricted role of prices as a factor of ad-
justment. This is caused by the presence of specific assets, while complete self-
enforcing safeguards are difficult to implement. These characteristics have conse-
quences for the usefulness of the role of the price mechanism to set the price of these 
contracts. In the case of classical contracts market is suitable as a governance structure 
and can be used to set the price. Given this, the question arises as to what the best 
mechanism (regarding price, allocation and co-ordination) is for contracts between gov-
ernment and farmers. 
 
Usually farmers combine assets like land, labour and capital with purchased inputs to 
produce agricultural products. To maintain the quality of wildlife and landscape it could 
be necessary  to reduce the intensity of some of these inputs while using more of certain 
other inputs. Depending on the setting, there are different types and levels of opportu-
nity costs (based on  dose-response methods, replacement cost, alternative costs, substi-
tute costs). All these opportunity costs have in common that they do not value a com-
modity via a demand curve (Marshallian or Hicksian) and therefore fail to provide ‘true’ 
valuation information and welfare measures. However these methods are still useful 
heuristic tools in any cost-benefits analysis of projects, policies or course of action 
(Bateman and Turner, 1993: 122 -113).        
 
7 TAKINGS OR TAKING OFF OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In many countries, the constitution circumscribes the power of the government  to take 
private property. Such power may only be used may only use if: (1) the private property 
is taken for a public use, and (2) the owner is compensated (Cooter and Ulen, 
1996:149). Two types of takings can be distinguished: 
1) Titular takings. In this all the property rights are taken off. The government 
takes land from many owners in order to provide some public goods, such as 
military basis, airports, highways and nature areas1. 
2) Regulatory takings. There is a restriction on the use of the property without tak-
ing the title from the owners. This which means a loss of a part of the property 
rights. 
 
Regulatory takings are a smaller issue than titular takings. The owner keeps the title, 
only a part of the property rights is taken off, and the regulation causes a fall in the 
                                                 
1 Titular takings are for sustainable agriculture less important than regulatory takings. However, titular 
takings makes the relationship between loss of property rights and compensation more clear.    
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value of the asset. Strong direct regulation to realize environmental friendly farming 
practices is a form of takings which means a loss of a part of the property rights.  
  
I now want to explain the economic rationale for the condition that if private property is 
taken for a public use, the owner should be compensated. 
(1) Takings are a way for the government to have resources to its disposal. They are an 
alternative to taxes. Taxes are assesses on a broad base, such as income, property, sales 
or bequest. Everyone subject to a tax faces the same schedule of rates. In contrast, a 
taking involves a particular piece of the property owned by a particular person. Tyranni-
cal leaders or governments sometimes finance government and enrich officials by tak-
ing property from individuals without compensating them. If the private property owner 
receives compensation equal to the market value of the property, the government could 
not profit from taking it. So the requirement of compensation can be view as a device to 
channel government finance into taxes and away from takings (Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 
149-150). 
 
The economic effects of the incentive of takings provide strong reason for financing the 
government by taxes a rather than by takings. Any kind of expropriation distorts peo-
ple’s incentives and causes economic inefficiency, but taxes distort far less than uncom-
pensated takings. This is specially true if taxes have a broad base (such as TAV). In 
contrast, takings have a very small base. Individual owners are prepared to go to great 
expense to prevent the government from taking their property without compensation. 
The possibility of uncompensated takings would divert effort and resource away from 
production and towards the policy of income distribution (Cooter and Ulen, 1996:150). 
If in a project the benefits arising from takings are insufficient to compensate the losers, 
the project will not be worth carrying out. An strong argument for compensation beside 
efficiency is that of equity (cf. Epstein, 1985: 4-5)      
 
(2) The requirement for compensation does not preclude another political abuse, which 
is the government taking one person’s property and selling it to some one else (and it 
gets a private use). Therefore the ‘public use‘ requirement prevents such a practice. 
However, the public use requirement does not solve the problem of inefficiency in in-
voluntary transfers (Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 151) 
 
(3) The government has to purchase large tracts of land from many owners in order to 
provide public goods, such as airports, ports, high ways, industry terrains and nature 
terrains. These project often demand ‘’contiguity’’, which means that the parcels of land 
must touch each other. The last owner can ‘’hold out’’ when the government wants con-
tiguous parcels of land needed for a public object. Even when owners do not hold out, 
the possibility of doing so can dramatically increase the transaction costs of purchasing 
contiguous property. The taking power of the government reduces this problem. How-
ever, from (1) and (2) we can conclude that it gives rise to efficiency. Therefore this 
type of takings should be guided by the principle: In general, the government should 
only take private property with compensation to provide a public good when transac-
tion cost preclude purchasing power the necessary property (Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 
151-152). 
 
Compensated and uncompensated takings have different incentive effects. If the gov-
ernment does not have to compensate for titular takings and regulatory taking, then it 
will impose too many of them. If there are too many restrictions, resources will be in-
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completely utilized. Thus, uncompensated restrictions result in inefficient use. Con-
versely, if the government must compensate fully for restrictions, then landowners will 
be indifferent about whether or not the government restricts them. Landowners (-users)  
will improve their property as if there were no risk that those restrictions could prevent 
the use of the improvement. If restrictions subsequently prevent its use, the investment 
will be wasted. 
 
The effect of titular takings and regulatory takings is quite different for private people 
compared to government officials. For private people the uncertainty about the conduct 
over the government plays an important role. The government might change the rules 
for land use. Doubts about the credibility of policy statements or the non-fulfilment of a 
policy plan give rise to time-inconsistency. This concept was identified and developed 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977: 475 - 475). According to them, time-inconsistency oc-
curs when a policy which originally seems optimal, after a time, or when the time 
comes to put it into practice, or as  time goes by, is no longer considered so by policy 
makers. Without a binding agreement to keep the government to the original plan, the 
latter has the authority to change to a new policy which appears better under the 
changed circumstances. The problem, if people realize this, is that they will anticipate a 
change in policy and will act in a way that results in politicians being unable to reach 
their original policy objectives. Time-inconsistency in government policies does not 
only result in strategic behaviour, but also stimulates risk-averse behaviour. 
 
In practice, a government regularly changes its policy about sustainability and land use. 
Uncertainty about these changes are internalized at the investment level. Full compensa-
tion means that the risks are low or even zero. In this case the investment level is the 
highest. It is even possible that full compensation might provide incentives for strong 
private efforts or investments. However, non-compensation for restrictions/takings 
gives government officials an incentive to overregulate, where as compensation for  
takings makes government officials internalize the full cost of expropriating private 
property rights (cf. Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 155). 
 
8 PRIVATE PROVISION WITH COMPENSATION OR CHARGES 
In most countries of the EU, in the USA and in Canada, it is more or less common prac-
tice to give farmers a compensation if they contribute to the preservation of wildlife and 
landscape. Using (financial) instruments to improve the quality of water soil and air, 
wildlife and landscape, the question that needs to be asked is on what principle the use 
of the instrument should be based. The difference between the principle the polluter 
pays and the principle that the one who makes a positive contribution to the preserva-
tion of the environment is rewarded  seems to be a matter of gradation. Also from the 
well-known point of view of the Coase theorem, it does not matter for efficiency 
whether the polluter pays or the polluter is paid. The question is, is it really so simple? 
In this section I discuss (1) the importance of the institutional environment; (2) positive 
or negative external effects; (3) charge or compensation; and (4) the nature of the com-
pensation. 
 
8.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The institutional environment is the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic, and social interactions. These consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conducts), and formal rules (constitutions, 
28 Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 
Discussion Paper 
laws, property rights). This definition comes from North (1991: 97), although instead of 
institutional environment he uses the term institutions. The institutional environment 
delineates the rules of the game within which the institutional arrangements actually 
operate. It determines the rules of conduct within which human actions take place. The 
institutional environment is a framework that defines the ways in which property rights 
can be implemented and enforced, and modifies for how they are specified, imple-
mented and protected. Existing property rights regimes make it difficult to persuade 
farmers to provide public goods like wildlife and landscape without compensation for 
the related opportunity costs. 
 
The institutional environment is not an unchanging constant, and by that, nor is the 
status of the property rights. According to Williamson (1998: 27) the institutional envi-
ronment changes considerably within a period of 10 - 100 years. This can have conse-
quences for the way in which the government recognizes and protects property rights. 
Property is a bundle of rights which describe what people may and may not do with the 
resources they own; the extent to what they may possess, use, transform, transfer, or 
exclude others from their property. Property rights are not immutable. They may, for 
example, change from one generation to another (Cooter and Ulen, 1996: 72).  
 
Under pressure of environmental problems or lack of sustainability, the government can 
no longer permit, for example: (1) farmers have an unlimited numbers of pigs; (2) 
farmer use unlimited amount of manure or minerals (such as N,P and K) on their land; 
(3) farmers spray their (fallow) field margins and ditch-side with pesticides or even with 
fertilisers. However, has a government the right to take away production rights of farm-
ers (see my discussion over takings) or introduce unsprayed field margins, all without 
compensation, if the farmer owns or use the land? One argument for unsprayed field 
margins is that by doing so soil and surface water are protected. This water is an impure 
public good. Exclusion of use and abuse (misuse) is, because of lack on property rights, 
very difficult. Polluted water or bad water is impure bad, and it is the negative external 
effect of certain activity. People can only withdraw or protected from this polluted water 
against high costs. 
 
Property rights are only effective if there is an authority willing to protect them. Gener-
ally, that authority is the government. The same government also has the power to make 
use of titular taking and regulatory takings. As well as equity considerations there are 
also reasons of efficiency for why the government should be reserved with takings 
without compensation. First, the lack of property rights or the threat to affect them ex-
erts a negative incentive on productive activities or investment behaviour of people. 
Second, if the government does not compensate, it will tend to make more frequent use 
of the instrument of takings. 
 
8.2 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS  
In addition to marketable goods such as food, raw materials, and ornamental plants, the 
agricultural sector also produces non-marketable goods. These are also called positive 
and negative external effects. They are the result of a specific way of using agricultural 
land. Agricultural landscape such as ‘small-scale landscapes’ (these are characterized by 
small fields surrounded by hedges or wooded banks) or peatland areas with narrow plots 
and wide ditches are the by-product of farming. Other amenities, open spaces and the 
rurality also belong to the positive external effects of the agricultural sector.  
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To the negative effects belong the harmful effects on the quality of soil, water and air. 
Examples of these effects are acidification, eutrophication, drying up, and greenhouse 
gases. To offer subsidies for activities with negative external effects can be undesirable. 
Baumol and Oates (1989: 211 - 233) show that subsidizing of emission reduction in a 
situation with full competition decreases the emission per firm, but increases total emis-
sion. The lower cost resulting from subsidies leads to a higher production per firm 
and/or the entry of new (polluting) firms. In this situation, subsidies are neither effective 
nor efficient (see also WRR, 1992: 133). Moreover, such an incentive structure sends 
out a wrong signal. Causing negative effects requires adaptation of the behaviour of 
farmers. The imposition of charge is an effort to attach a price to negative external ef-
fects, through which they are included in the production and consumption decision of 
economic subjects. The legitimacy of this method can be traced back to the polluter 
pays principle (PPP). 
 
8.3 NATURE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT: CHARGE OR COMPENSATION 
The border between negative and positive external effects is neither absolute nor con-
stant. It is more a matter of a sliding scale. One example is the management of road 
verges in the Netherlands. In the past, they were usually regularly mowed, to make them 
look like lawns. Many people liked it. Nowadays they are rarely mowed. According to 
some people, this change in management is a positive external effect, and according to 
others a negative external effect.  
 
The border between negative external effects and positive external effects, and the 
judgement about whether if a certain change in the environment is positive or negative 
does not depend on personal preferences alone, but also on the reference level. Hanley 
et al. (1998:103) define the reference level of the environment as the level of the quality 
of the environment society finds it should be. According to Hanneman (1999:75) people 
have relative rather than absolute preferences for items, and they judge a situation not in 
terms of absolute levels of attributes but, rather in relation to some reference level. This 
can be the status quo, the pre-existing level of the item, or it can be a norm or an expec-
tation regarding the item’s level. 
 
When a new factory, which pollutes soil, water and air, is established the reference level 
is the situation before there was pollution, before there was a factory. In practice, the 
determination of a clear reference level is often controversial. If such a level could be 
determined for wildlife and landscape, and if society find that the quality level of wild-
life and landscape by farmers is brought under the reference level, then farmers will 
cause external costs. Conversely, if the present level is higher than the reference level 
and farmers increase the volume and quality of these public goods, they will produce 
external benefits.  
 
Bromley and Hodge (1990: 208-209) have a somewhat different view of the reference 
level. They connect the reference level with the allocation of the individual property 
rights of the farmers, i.e. the allocation of the power of these rights between them and 
the government. This allocation can change with time. How do shifts in the allocation of 
property rights come about?  An important influence on the changes is the shifting of 
people’s preferences. Changing preferences lead to change in the optimal level of envi-
ronmental quality. This means that by changing preference the reference level also 
changes. The status quo property rights arrangements which have served agriculture so 
well, exist for historical reasons and may not necessarily be appropriate for the future. 
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Shifting values and changing perceptions of the role of agriculture will surely bring 
about at least marginal shifts in property rights and policy entitlement (Bromley and 
Hodge, 1990: 212). 
 
However, because of the economic valuation of changes, caution is needed in using a 
sliding transition between negative and positive external effects. According to Knetsch 
(1999: 9) the economic valuation of a change strongly depends on the level at which the 
change take place, under or above the reference level. Positive changes are often seen as 
a gain, but given the nature of the change relative to the reference level, individuals may 
see some positive changes as being a reduction of loss. Similarly, negative changes can 
be either losses or, if in the domain of gains, may be viewed as foregone gains. 
 
The distinction between whether a change is in the domain of gains or in the domain of 
losses is important for the following reason. A positive change that results in reducing a 
loss will normally be more valuable than one that provides a gain. And a negative 
change, which imposes a loss, will be far more averse than one that results in just fore-
going a gain. Reducing pollution levels, for example, is likely to be more valuable, and 
is more likely to be economically justified if viewed by people as something that re-
duces the harm of pollution than if considered by them to be a gain in environmental 
quality. This makes it important to distinguish between gains and reductions of losses, 
and between losses and foregone gains, and to use the correct measure to assess them. 
Losses and reduction of losses are most appropriately assessed by using the WTA 
measure, and gains and foregone gains by using the WTP measure (Knetsch, 1997, cited 
in Knetsch, 1999: 9).    
 
With and without comparison. The determination of whether an activity causes the re-
duction of a negative externality or an increase in positive externality can also be based 
on a with and without comparison. If farmers use excessive amount of manure and/or 
fertilizers (= with situation), the quality of water  decreases. This can cause extra high 
costs for water supply companies. A reduction of the use of both to a balanced fertiliza-
tion (= without situation) involves a reduction of negative external effect. For wildlife 
and landscape it is important to preserve the characteristic and valuable agricultural 
landscapes, interesting natural elements and small nature areas. The presence of 
meadow birds, but also the preservation of characteristic landscapes are dependent on a 
special type of farming (= with situation). Farmers who farm in this way  public goods. 
Without these farmers and this type of farming that type of wildlife and landscape 
would not be there (= without situation) 
 
Both with the reference level concept and with the with and without concept it depends 
on guiding principles (such as PPP, regulation or direct government intervention like 
titular takings) in a society, if farmers are forced or stimulated by direct regulation, 
charges or compensations to preserve the quality of soil, water and air and wildlife and 
landscape. On the one hand such principles reflect the view of the society over the 
trade-off between a fair income distribution and providing public goods. On the other 
hand, compensation means a recognition of the property rights. In spite of shifting pref-
erences and property rights relations, at the moment in the Western countries there is a 
certain consensus to compensate farmers for activities which provide external benefits.  
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8.4 THE NATURE OF THE COMPENSATION 
For private agents such as farmers who produce positive external effects like varied 
wildlife, beautiful and valuable landscapes, or other environmental goods there should 
be a symmetric opposite principle to the PPP. The government as the representative of 
consumers could bring about an optimal level of the supply of such public goods (cf. 
Hanley et al.,1998: 102). The nature of the compensations could be based on demand or 
supply side. Demand assumes that those who benefit from such public goods should pay 
a marginal value-based fee to the providers of such goods (such as day trippers to scenic 
rural areas, or hunters in wetlands) This fee could be on a per trip or annual basis, or 
could be implemented through land purchase or leasing (Hanley et al., 1998: 103). It is 
similar to the well-known benefit-received principle from the public finance. In that 
case, we have to do with individualized public goods. 
 
This demand-approach is hardly applied in the EU countries and in the USA. More ap-
plication is to be found for the supply oriented approach (cf. Hanley et al., 1998: 104). 
This  involves the government identifying an appropriate level of supply for rural public 
goods. The providers of these goods get a compensation based on the opportunity costs. 
The amount and the (quality) level is determined de facto by the budget of the govern-
ment. This is the approach mostly used in EU countries and USA this approach is 
mostly used. An important argument for this supply approach, instead of the demand 
side approach, is the reduction of the transaction costs.   
 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Under the influence of changes in the institutional environment the meaning about the 
protection of  property rights is shifting. Farmers will say: it is my land, and therefore I 
have the property rights. Civilians will say: it is our environment. Because of the envi-
ronment or environmental goods, public goods are taking an increasingly larger part of 
the agricultural land (including the amenities) and are becoming part of the public do-
main (cf. Barzel 1997: 5). This has consequences for the specification and protection of 
property rights, and with that the right, for compensation of farmers. It should be 
stressed that for common goods, there are no individual rights, only common rights. 
 
As well as reasons of equity considerations, there are also reasons of efficiency why a 
government should be careful with taking or reducing of property rights without com-
pensation. First, the lack of property rights or the threat to affect them exerts a negative 
incentive on productive activities or investment behaviour of people. Second, if a gov-
ernment does not have to compensate, it will tend to make frequent use of the instru-
ment of takings. 
 
The economic valuation of changes in the quality of soil, water, wildlife and landscape 
depends on the change taking place either below or above the reference level. This is 
(besides the argument that in the case of negative external effects subsidies are neither 
effective nor efficient) an extra argument for applying the PPP or regulation for nega-
tive external effects to environmental goods, which are below the reference level. To 
stimulate providing positive external effects above this level, compensation based on 
the opportunity principle is an appropriate incentive both from efficiency an equity con-
siderations. Finally, from the actual behaviour of the government, can be concluded that 
the reference level is being used more and more as a watershed to the question of the 
allocation of property rights and the use of charges or compensation. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
Important research questions can de divided into several groups. 
(1) Environmental policy 
• What should be the targets of the government policy to get a sustainable agricultural 
sector: fixed or flexible? 
• Can they be developed in a interactive process? 
• What the instruments should be or can be used (based on effect, effectiveness, effi-
ciency, income distribution aspects and legitimacy)? The approach of Oskam et al., 
(1998) could be very useful here.  
(2) Institutional environment  
• What is the initial situation? 
• What are the most important formal and informal rules regarding food, sustainabil-
ity, agriculture and land use, and what changes can be expected? 
• What will be the long term trends for food consumption and production?  
• How will change the preferences of consumers regarding food production, land use 
and what will be the effect on property rights? 
• What do we know about the reference level? 
• What type of institutional innovation is necessary? 
(3) Institutional arrangements 
• What will be most efficient governance structure?   
• Which third way solutions are possible and necessary for impure public goods like 
wildlife and landscape, quality of soil, water and air? 
(4) What is the meaning and direction of process of institutional reform (innovation) of 
the EU, the so-called Acquis Communautaire? Could it be used as a guideline? 
 
Plan of approach  
(1) Use the Bruntland defintion of sustainability as a guideline. 
(2) Develop indicators for the relevant or most important environmental goods. For this 
purpose we can make use of e.g. recent OECD-studies. 
(3) Develop indicators for the economic and social dimension of sustainable agriculture. 
(4) Formulate objectives for the environmental, economic and social dimension of sus-
tainable agriculture (We have to make a choice between fixed or flexible target. It 
might be  preferable to use a interactive approach)   
(5) Analyse which instruments could be used. The characteristics of the environmental 
problem, the institutional environment and the institutional arrangements determine 
which type of institutional innovation is necessary and which instruments could fit 
in effective and efficient sustainable policy.  
(6) For the choice between the policy alternatives a cost-benefits analysis (including 
non-marketable goods or bads) over a long period is very useful. 
(7) The formulation of a sustainable policy means that we have to weighing up material 
and in-material welfare on the one hand, and on the other weighing up between the 
interest of different social groups and generations. Both are a part of the institutional 
environment.   
(8) Use the meaning and direction of process of institutional reforms (innovation) of the 
EU, the so-called Acquis Communautaire as guideline for necessary adaptations 
(9) Analyse institutional environment, looking at:  
• the initial situation; 
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• the most important formal and informal rules regarding food, sustainability, agricul-
ture and land use, what changes can be expected, and what institutional innovations 
are necessary;   
• how the preferences of consumers regarding food production and land use change 
and what will be the effect on  property rights; 
• what is known about the reference level 
(10) Analyse the institutional arrangements, looking at: 
• the most efficient governance structure  
• which third way solutions are possible and necessary for impure public goods like 
wildlife and landscape, quality of soil, water and air. 
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